ABUSE/NEGLECT
Extension Of Placement - Permanency Goal
Matter of Alexcander "B (3rd Dept., 10/18/ 01)

Please Note: There have been several changes in NYS permanency statutes since 2002.
See LINK Family Legal Framework Resources for a list of articles by Atty. Burt reflecting current law and regulation and
the NYS OCFS website for information on recent permanency legislation.

The Third Department holds, inter alia, that, in view of the Family Court's power to "adjust or modify [the permanency] plan" and the fact that adoption can be a legitimate permanency goal in advance of a finding of permanent neglect, the Family Court had authority to change the permanent plan to adoption in the absence of a finding of permanent neglect. 2001 WL 1242897 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.)
(Cite as: 2001 N.Y. Slip Op. 07901)

In the Matter of ALEXZANDER "B", [FN1] a Neglected Child. TOMPKINS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent;
v. TONYA "D", [FN1]Appellant. 87566
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York
Decided and Entered: October 18, 2001
Calendar Date: September 11, 2001
Before: Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Peters, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Lenore Neerbasch, Ithaca, for appellant
Martha Fineman-Sowers, Tompkins County
Department of Social Services (Liam G.B. Murphy of Ward & Murphy, Groton, of counsel), Ithaca, for respondent.
Law Offices of Carman M. Garufi (Christopher A. Pogson of counsel), Law Guardian, Binghamton, for Alexzander "B".

MAJORITY OPINION

Mercure, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Tompkins County (Barrett, J.), entered June 20, 2000, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, to, inter alia, extend placement of respondent's child with petitioner for a period of 12 months. In 1997, Family Court entered a stipulated order of adjudication and disposition adjudging Alexzander "B" (hereinafter the child), respondent's son, to be neglected by her, continuing custody of the child with his parents, placing respondent under petitioner's supervision, requiring that respondent obtain a psychological evaluation and fully participate in individual and family/couples counseling as recommended by said evaluation, and also requiring that respondent attend regularly scheduled meetings with petitioner in order to participate in the development of a family service plan [FN2]. A further neglect petition filed in June 1998 resulted in a second stipulated order of neglect and suspended judgment, this time providing for the child's placement with his grandmother until August 31, 1999. A violation petition was filed in July 1999 and respondent ultimately stipulated to an extension of the child's placement to April 8, 2000. 

Just prior to the expiration of that placement, petitioner filed a further petition alleging that respondent had violated the most recent stipulated order of disposition and permanency plan by, among other things, failing to maintain a stable living environment, failing to participate in visitation programs and advanced parenting classes, and failing to attend court-ordered counseling. Three days later, petitioner filed an order to show cause seeking a temporary order extending the child's placement pending a final determination of the violation petition. After the conclusion of a fact- finding hearing on June 20, 2000, Family Court found that respondent had violated the terms of the stipulated order and permanency plan, extended the child's placement for 12 months and modified the permanency plan by changing its goal from reunification with respondent to adoption by the grandmother. Respondent appeals. [FN3]

Initially, we note that so much of Family Court's order as provided for the placement of the child expired in June 2001, thereby rendering that portion of the appeal moot (see, Matter of Lisa Z. [Sherry X.], 276 AD2d 853; Matter of Michael OO. [Wade OO.], 267 AD2d 638). In addition, there is no indication that subsequent extensions have been granted (c£, Matter of Jennifer WW. [Anthony WW.], 260 AD2d 672, 673) or that respondent initiated a new appeal from any such extension (see, Matter of Anna HH. [Jerome HH.], 223 AD2d 880, 881). Were we to consider the merits, the result would be no different than that reached by

FN1. Fictitious names.
FN2. The 1997 proceeding also involved another of respondent's children. In October 1997, she surrendered her parental rights with respect to that child, who is not at issue in this proceeding
FN3. Notwithstanding certain equivocal statements made in regard to the permanency plan at oral argument, we decide this appeal based on the record before us. . 

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